Sunspot Equilibrium in General Quitting Games by Solan, Eilon & Solan, Omri Nisan
ar
X
iv
:1
80
3.
00
87
8v
2 
 [m
ath
.PR
]  
5 A
ug
 20
19 Sunspot Equilibrium in Positive RecursiveGeneral Quitting Games∗
Eilon Solan and Omri N. Solan†
August 6, 2019
Abstract
We prove that positive recursive general quitting games, which are
quitting games in which each player may have more than one continue
action, admit a sunspot ε-equilibrium, for every ε > 0. To this end we
show that the equilibrium set of strategic-form games can be uniformly
approximated by a smooth manifold, and develop a new fixed-point
theorem for smooth manifolds.
Keywords: Stochastic games, general quitting games, uniform equilibrium,
sunspot equilibrium, equilibrium manifold.
1 Introduction
One of the central open questions in game theory to date is whether every
multiplayer stochastic games admits a uniform equilibrium payoff. Mertens
and Neyman (1981) proved that two-player zero-sum stochastic games ad-
mit a uniform value, Vieille (2000a, 2000b) proved that two-player nonzero-
sum stochastic games admit a uniform equilibrium payoff, and Solan (1999)
proved that three-player absorbing games admit a uniform equilibrium pay-
off. Solan and Vieille (2001) presented the family of quitting games, and
∗The authors thank Hari Govindan, Ehud Lehrer, and John Levy for useful discussions.
E. Solan acknowledges the support of the Israel Science Foundation, grant #217/17.
†The School of Mathematical Sciences, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv 6997800, Israel.
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showed that a certain class of multiplayer quitting games admit a uniform
equilibrium payoff. Further results regarding the existence of uniform equi-
librium in quitting games were proven by Simon (2012) and Solan and Solan
(2019).
While the existence of a uniform equilibrium payoff in general stochastic
games is still an open problem, the existence of an extensive-form correlated
equilibrium payoff in multiplayer stochastic game was proven by Solan and
Vieille (2002). Recall that an extensive-form correlated equilibrium payoff is
a uniform equilibrium payoff in an extended game, which includes a correla-
tion device that sends at every stage a private signal to each player, where
the signal can depend on past signals sent to all players. Solan and Vohra
(2001, 2002) proved that every absorbing game admits a normal-form corre-
lated equilibrium payoff, which is a uniform equilibrium payoff in an extended
game that includes a correlation device that sends one private signal to each
player at the outset of the game.
Recently Solan and Solan (2019) proved that every quitting game admits
a sunspot equilibrium payoff, which is an equilibrium payoff in an extended
game that includes a correlation device that sends at every stage a public
signal that is uniformly distributed on [0, 1] and independent of past signals
and play.
In this paper we extend the result of Solan and Solan (2019) to a more
general class of absorbing games, namely, the class of positive recursive gen-
eral quitting games. These are quitting games in which (a) each player has a
single quitting action and possibly several continue actions, (b) the nonab-
sorbing payoff is 0, and (c) the absorbing payoffs are nonnegative.
In addition to proving that a sunspot equilibrium payoff exists in the class
of positive recursive general quitting games, the paper has several contribu-
tions, which are needed in the proof of the main result.
• We show that the equilibrium set can be uniformly approximated by
smooth manifolds, a property that allows us to use topological results
that require manifolds to be smooth.
• We develop a new fixed point result for smooth manifolds.
• We develop a new technique for studying multiplayer absorbing games,
which reduces an absorbing game into a collection of quitting games.
• As noted by Solan, Solan, and Solan (2018), our results imply that if at
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least two players have at least two continue actions, then the positive
recursive general quitting game admits a uniform equilibrium payoff.
The paper is organized as follows. The model and the main game theo-
retic result are described in Section 2. The proof for the case in which one
player has two continue actions and all other players have one continue ac-
tion appears in Section 3. Section 4 presents the results in topology that we
need in the main proofs, and Section 5 shows that the equilibrium set can be
uniformly approximated by smooth manifolds. In Section 6 we provide the
proof of the main result. Section 7 discusses extensions of our main game
theoretic result to other classes of absorbing games.
2 The Model and Main Results
2.1 General Quitting Games
Definition 2.1 A general quitting game is a vector Γ = (I, (Aci)i∈I , u) where
• I is a finite set of players.
• Aci is a finite nonempty set of continue actions, for each player i ∈ I.
The set of all actions of player i is Ai := A
c
i ∪ {Qi}, where Qi is
interpreted as a quitting action. The set of all action profiles is A :=
×i∈IAi and the set of all absorbing action profiles is A∗ := A\(×i∈IAci).
• u : A→ [−1, 1]I is a payoff function.
The game proceeds as follows. At every stage t ∈ N, each player i ∈ I
chooses an action ati ∈ Ai. Let at := (ati)i∈I be the action profile chosen at
stage t. We denote by t∗ the first stage in which a quitting action is played;
that is,
t∗ := min{t ∈ N : at ∈ A∗},
with the convention that the minimum of an empty set is ∞.
A mixed action of player i is an element of ∆(Ai). Each action ai ∈ Ai
is identified with the mixed action that assigns probability 1 to ai. A (be-
havior) strategy of player i is a function σi : (∪∞t=0At) → ∆(Ai). A strategy
profile is a vector of strategies σ = (σi)i∈I , one for each player. We identify
each mixed action profile x ∈ X := ×i∈I∆(Ai) with the stationary strategy
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profile that plays x at every stage. Every strategy profile σ induces a proba-
bility distribution over the set of plays A∞. Denote by Eσ the corresponding
expectation operator. The (undiscounted) payoff under strategy profile σ is
γ(σ) := Eσ
[
lim sup
T→∞
1
T
T∑
t=1
u(amin{t,t∗})
]
.
Thus, the play is effectively terminated at stage t∗.
Definition 2.2 Let (I, (Aci)i∈I , u) be a general quitting game and let ε ≥ 0.
A strategy profile σ = (σi)i∈I is an ε-equilibrium if for every player i ∈ I
and every strategy σ′i of player i,
γi(σ) ≥ γi(σ′i, σ−i)− ε.
The equilibrium concept that we study in this paper is undiscounted equi-
librium. By arguments similar to those of Solan and Vieille (2001, Section
2.6), our results apply to the stronger notion of uniform equilibrium.
General quitting games in which each player has a single continue action
are called quitting games. Flesch, Thuijsman, and Vrieze (1997) studied
a specific three-player quitting game and identified the set of its uniform
equilibrium payoffs.
Solan (1999) proved that every three-player absorbing game admits an
ε-equilibrium, for every ε > 0. To date it is not known whether this result
extends to absorbing games with more than three players; for partial results
on the existence of undiscounted equilibrium in multiplayer quitting games,
see Solan and Vieille (2001), Simon (2012), and Solan and Solan (2019).
In this paper we will be interested in the class of positive recursive general
quitting games, which we define now.
Definition 2.3 A general quitting game Γ = (I, (Aci)i∈I , u) is recursive if
u(a) = ~0 for every nonabsorbing action profile a ∈ ×i∈IAci . A general quitting
game Γ = (I, (Aci)i∈I , u) is positive if ui(a) ≥ 0 for every player i ∈ I and
every action profile a ∈ A.
2.2 Sunspot Equilibrium
We enrich the general quitting game Γ by introducing a public correlation
device: at the beginning of every stage t ∈ N the players observe a public
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signal yt ∈ [0, 1] that is drawn according to the uniform distribution, inde-
pendently of past signals and play. The extended game is denoted by ΓE .
The set of finite histories in the game ΓE is HE := ∪t∈N ([0, 1]t × At−1).
A strategy of player i in the game ΓE is a sequence of measurable functions
ξi = (ξ
t
i)t∈N, where ξ
t
i : [0, 1]
t × At−1 → ∆(Ai). The interpretation of ξti is
that if the play was not terminated before stage t, then at stage t player i
plays the mixed action ξti(y
1, a1, y2, a2, · · · , at−1, yt).
Every strategy profile ξ = (ξi)i∈I induces a probability distribution over
the set of plays in the game with public correlation device, with a corre-
sponding expectation operator that is denoted by Eξ. Denote by
γ(ξ) := Eξ
[
lim sup
T→∞
1
T
T∑
t=1
u(amin{t,t∗})
]
the expected undiscounted payoff under strategy profile ξ. An ε-equilibrium
in the extended game ΓE is called a sunspot ε-equilibrium of the original
game Γ.
Definition 2.4 A strategy profile ξ is a sunspot ε-equilibrium of Γ if it is
an ε-equilibrium in the extended game ΓE, that is, if for every i ∈ I and
every strategy ξ′i of player i we have
γi(ξ) ≥ γi(ξ′i, ξ−i)− ε.
Solan and Solan (2019) proved that every quitting game admits a sunspot
ε-equilibrium, for every ε > 0. Our main game theoretic result concerns the
extension of this result to positive recursive general quitting games.
Theorem 2.5 Every positive recursive general quitting game admits a sunspot
ε-equilibrium, for every ε > 0.
2.3 Sunspot Equilibrium in Quitting Games
In this section we restrict attention to a fixed quitting game Γ. For each
player i ∈ I we denote his single continue action by Ci. Denote by ~C = (Ci)i∈I
the action profile under which all players continue. For every player i ∈ I
denote by ~C−i = (Cj)j 6=i the action profile in which all players except player i
continue.
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We will use the λ-discounted version of the game, where the payoff is
given by
γλ(σ) := Eσ
[
λ
∞∑
t=1
(1− λ)t−1u(amin{t,t∗})
]
,
and the concept of equilibrium is defined w.r.t. the λ-discounted payoff.
Solan and Solan (2019) studied sunspot equilibrium in quitting games
and proved the following result.1 To state the result we need notations. For
every mixed action profile x ∈ X denote by p(x) := 1 − ∏i∈I xi(Aci) the
per-stage probability of absorption under x. The mixed action profile x is
absorbing if p(x) > 0, and nonabsorbing if p(x) = 0.
Theorem 2.6 (Solan and Solan, 2019) Let Γ = (I, ({Ci, Qi})i∈I , u) be a
positive recursive quitting game. At least one of the following conditions
holds.
A.1 For every ε > 0 the game Γ admits a sunspot ε-equilibrium ξ in which,
after every finite history, at most one player i plays the action Qi,
and the probability by which this player plays the action Qi is at most
ε. Moreover, the expected payoff to each player i ∈ I after every finite
history along which the play was not yet absorbed is at least ui(Qi, ~C−i):
γi(ξ | ht) ≥ ui(Qi, ~C−i), ∀i ∈ I, ∀ht ∈ HE.
A.2 There is η > 0 such that for every function λ 7→ xλ that maps every
λ ∈ (0, 1] to a λ-discounted stationary equilibrium xλ in Γ such that
limλ→0 xλ exists, we have limλ→0 p(xλ) ≥ η.
The next result, which follows from the continuity of the discounted pay-
off, states that if the limit of stationary λ-discounted equilibria of a quitting
game as the discount factor λ goes to 0 is absorbing, then the limit is a
stationary 0-equilibrium.
Lemma 2.7 Fix the set I of players, and for every k ∈ N let Γ[k] =
(I, ({Ci, Qi})i∈I , u[k]) be a quitting game, such that the sequence (u[k])k∈N
1The main result of Solan and Solan (2019) involves the concept of normal players. In a
positive recursive quitting game, all players are normal, hence the statement that appears
here is equivalent to the one of Solan and Solan (2019).
6
of payoff functions converges to a payoff function u. Let (λ[k])k∈N be a se-
quence of discount factors that converges to 0. For every k ∈ N let x[k] be
a stationary λ[k]-discounted equilibrium in the quitting game Γ[k] such that
the limit x := limk→∞ x
[k] exists and satisfies p(x) ∈ (0, ε). Then the quit-
ting game (I, ({Ci, Qi})i∈I , u) admits an ε-equilibrium for every ε > 0. If
the quitting game (I, ({Ci, Qi})i∈I , u) is positive and recursive, then x is a
stationary 0-equilibrium.
The ε-equilibrium that exists in the quitting game (I, ({Ci, Qi})i∈I , u)
according to Lemma 2.7 may be of two possible types:
• If under x at least two players quit with positive probability, then x is
a stationary 0-equilibrium of (I, ({Ci, Qi})i∈I , u).
• If under x exactly one player, say, Player 1, quits with positive prob-
ability, then Player 1 may find it beneficial to continue rather than to
quit when the other players follow x−1. To guarantee that such a devia-
tion is not profitable in the game (I, ({Ci, Qi})i∈I , u), the other players
will punish Player 1 at his min-max level if the game is not absorbed
after sufficiently many stages have elapsed.
If the game (I, ({Ci, Qi})i∈I , u) is positive and recursive, then in the sec-
ond case, Player 1 cannot profit by not quitting, hence x is a stationary
0-equilibrium in this case as well.
2.4 A Family of Auxiliary Games
In this section we fix a positive recursive general quitting game Γ and we
define a family of auxiliary quitting games, which will prove essential for
our proof technique. After defining these auxiliary games we will provide
two simple relations between equilibria in these games and equilibria in the
original game.
Fix a general quitting game Γ. For each player i ∈ I denote an element
αi ∈ ∆(Aci) by α1iC1i + · · · + αkii Ckii , where ki := |Aci | is the number of
continue actions of player i and Aci = {C1i , · · · , Ckii }. For every vector α =
(α1, · · · , α|I|) ∈ ×i∈I∆(Aci) and every q ∈ RI define an auxiliary quitting
game Γα,q that is based on Γ and is defined as follows:
• Whenever player i continues, it is as if he plays each continue action
Cki in Γ with probability α
k
i , for 1 ≤ k ≤ ki.
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• The nonabsorbing payoff is q.
Formally, the stage payoff in the game Γα,q, denoted uα,q(·), is defined as
follows, where ~CJ = (Cj)j∈J , ~QJ = (Qj)j∈J , and ~αJ = (αj)j∈J for every
subset J of players.
uα,q( ~C) := q,
uα,q( ~CJ , ~QI\J) := u(~αJ , ~QI\J), ∅ ⊆ J ⊂ I.
Denote by γα,q the payoff function of the auxiliary game Γα,q.
For every i ∈ I, a mixed action of player i in the auxiliary game Γα,q is
equivalent to an element x̂i ∈ [0, 1], which is interpreted as the probability
that player i quits. The mixed action x̂i corresponds to a mixed action
xi = xi(x̂i, αi) ∈ ∆(Ai) in the game Γ as follows:
xi(Qi) := x̂i,
xi(C
k
i ) := (1− x̂i)αki , ∀k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , ki}.
(1)
This correspondence between mixed actions in the auxiliary game Γα,q and
mixed actions in the original game Γ can be used to map strategies in the
game Γα,q,E into strategies in the game ΓE as follows. For every finite history
ht = (y1, a1, · · · , yt) ∈ HE let ĥt = (ŷ1, â1, · · · , ŷt) be the history in the
auxiliary game Γα,q,E that is defined as follows:
ŷk := yk, 1 ≤ k ≤ t,
âki :=
{
aki , a
k
i = Qi,
Ci, a
k
i ∈ Aci .
In words, we replace all continue actions in ht by the unique continue action
of the player in the auxiliary game. Given a strategy ξ̂i in the game Γ
α,q,E
we define a strategy ξi in the game Γ
E by
ξi(h
t) := xi(ξ̂i(ĥ
t), αi), ∀i ∈ I, ∀ht ∈ HE. (2)
The reader can verify that for every strategy profile ξ̂ in Γα,q,E, if the strategy
profile ξ is defined as in Eq. (2), then
γ(ξ) = γ̂α,q(ξ̂). (3)
8
Lemma 2.8 Let Γ be a positive recursive general quitting game and let ε > 0
be sufficiently small. Suppose that there exist α = (α1, · · · , α|I|) ∈ ×i∈I∆(Aci)
and q ∈ RI such that the game Γα,q admits a sunspot ε-equilibrium ξ̂ satis-
fying (a) for every finite history ĥt in the game Γα,q,E,
γi(ξ̂ | ĥt) ≥ ui(Qi, ~C−i), ∀i ∈ I,
and (b) under ξ̂, at every stage at most one player quits, and he does so with
probability at most ε. Then the game Γ admits a sunspot 3ε-equilibrium.
Proof. The proof is standard, hence we provide only a sketch. Let ξ̂
be a sunspot ε-equilibrium in the game Γα,q that satisfies properties (a) and
(b). We will show that the strategy profile ξ that is defined as in Eq. (2),
supplemented with statistical tests and threat of punishment, satisfies the
desired result.
Fix a player i ∈ I. We will now check whether player i can profit by
deviating from ξ. Condition (b) says that after every finite history, the play
is ε-close to ~C, and Eq. (3) implies that γ(ξ | ht) = γ̂α,q(ξ̂ | ht) for every finite
history ht ∈ HE. Consequently, Condition (a) implies that player i cannot
gain more than ε by playing Qi after any finite history h
t ∈ HE. Thus, the
only possible profitable deviation of player i is to change the probabilities
by which he plays his continue actions. Since the per-stage probability by
which players quit is at most ε, and since player i plays the mixed action
αi until the game terminates, provided ε is sufficiently small, by conducting
statistical tests players I \ {i} can check whether player i plays his continue
actions according to the mixed action αi, and punish Player 1 at his min-max
level if he is found deviating. Since the game is positive and recursive, such
a deviation cannot be profitable for player i. It follows that the strategy
profile ξ supplemented with statistical tests and threats of punishment is a
3ε-equilibrium in the game ΓE.
Lemma 2.9 Let Γ be a positive recursive general quitting game and let ε > 0
be sufficiently small. Suppose that there exist α ∈ ×i∈I∆(Aci) and q ∈ RI
such that the game Γα,q admits a stationary 0-equilibrium x̂ ∈ [0, 1]I such
that p(x̂) ∈ (0, ε2). Then the game Γ admits an ε-equilibrium.
Proof. Consider the stationary strategy profile x = (xi)i∈I in Γ that is
defined by
xi := xi(x̂i, αi).
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Fix now a player i ∈ I. Since x̂ is a 0-equilibrium in Γα,q it follows that
γi(x) = γ
α,q
i (x̂) ≥ γα,qi (Qi, x̂−i) = γi(Qi, x−i). (4)
Moreover, if x̂i(Qi) > 0 then there is an equality in Eq. (4). It follows that
player i cannot profit by changing the probability by which he plays the
action Qi. Thus, the only profitable deviations of player i may be to change
the frequency in which he plays his continue actions. Since p(x̂) < ε2, the
probability that the game is absorbed in a stage in which player i plays a
continue action is bounded by ε2. Therefore, as in the proof of Lemma 2.8,
provided ε is sufficiently small, every set of |I| − 1 players can perform a
statistical test that checks whether the |I|’th player plays his continue actions
with the frequency indicated by x, and if not, punish him at his min-max
level.
It follows that the stationary strategy profile x, supplemented with sta-
tistical tests and threat of punishment, is an ε-equilibrium in Γ, provided ε
is sufficiently small.
To complete the proof of Theorem 2.5 we will consider from no on only
positive recursive general quitting games that do not satisfy the conditions
of Lemmas 2.8 and 2.9. In Section 3 we provide a proof for the special case
in which Player 1 has two continue actions and each other player has a single
continue action. This case exhibits some important aspects of the proof of
the general case, and will help us explain the need for the new tools that we
develop in the sequel. The general case is proven in Section 6.
3 The Proof for the Case |Ac1| = 2 and |Aci | = 1
for Every i 6= 1
In this section we prove Theorem 2.5 when Player 1 has two continue actions
while all other players have a single continue action. In this case the set of
mixed continue action profiles ×i∈I∆(Aci) is equivalent to the unit interval.
We will therefore describe a mixed continue action profile by a number α1 ∈
[0, 1] instead of α = (αi)i∈I , with the interpretation that α1 is the probability
that Player 1 assigns to the continue action C11 (and 1−α1 is the probability
that he assigns to the action C21).
One interesting aspect of the case |Ac1| = 2 and |Aci | = 1 for every i 6= 1
is that it uses Browder’s Theorem, which we present now, instead of a more
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sophisticated fixed point theorem that we will need for the general case.
The authors are not aware of another application of Browder’s Theorem in
dynamic games.
Theorem 3.1 (Browder, 1960) Let X ⊆ Rn be a convex and open set, let
K ⊆ X be convex and compact, and let F : [0, 1]×X → K be a continuous
function. Let CF := {(t, x) ∈ [0, 1]×X : x = f(t, x)} be the set of fixed points
of f . There is a connected component T of CF such that T ∩ ({0} ×X) 6= ∅
and T ∩ ({1} ×X) 6= ∅.
By Brouwer’s Fixed Point Theorem, every continuous function F : X →
K has at least one fixed point. Browder’s Theorem states that when the func-
tion F depends continuously on a one-dimensional parameter whose range2 is
[0, 1], the set of fixed points, as a function of the parameter, has a connected
component whose projection to the set of parameters is [0, 1].
We will show that, for a given δ > 0, the game Γ admits a sunspot δ-
equilibrium. To this end we will assume throughout that Condition (A.2) in
Theorem 2.6 holds and that the condition of Lemma 2.9 does not hold.
Condition (A.2) of Theorem 2.6 says3 that there exist α∗1 ∈ ∆({C11 , C21}),
q∗ ∈ RI , and η > 0 such that for every function λ 7→ xλ that maps every
λ ∈ (0, 1] to a λ-discounted stationary equilibrium xλ in Γα∗1,q∗ such that
limλ→0 xλ exists, we have limλ→0 p(xλ) ≥ η.
Step 1: Applying Browder’s Theorem.
For every λ ∈ (0, 1], every α1 ∈ [0, 1], denote by Mλ(α1) ⊆ [0, 1]I the set
of λ-discounted stationary equilibria of the game Γα1,q
∗
:
Mλ(α1) :=
{
x̂ ∈ [0, 1]I : x̂ is a λ-discounted stationary equilibrium of Γα1,q∗} .
Denote by Mλ ⊆ [0, 1]× [0, 1]I the graph of the function Mλ(·).
Browder’s Theorem implies4 that there exists a connected component of
Mλ that intersects both {0} × [0, 1]I and {1} × [0, 1]I . Because the set Mλ
2As John Levy pointed out to the authors, when F is semialgebraic, Browder’s Theorem
extends to multi-dimensional compact and convex parameter sets.
3In fact, Theorem 2.6 implies that the condition holds for every α1 ∈ [0, 1] and every
q∗ ∈ RI .
4To apply Browder’s Theorem we need to show that the setMλ is the set of fixed points
of some continuous function f : [0, 1]× [0, 1]I → [0, 1]I . Such a function can be constructed
using the function devised in Nash (1950) to prove the existence of equilibrium in strategic
form games, by observing that a λ-discounted stationary equilibrium is a fixed point of
the Shapley operator; see Fink (1964). Browder’s Theorem is applied to K = [0, 1]I and
X = [−ε, ε]I .
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is semialgebraic, this in turn implies that there is a continuous path in Mλ
that intersects both {0} × [0, 1]I and {1} × [0, 1]I .
Step 2: Constructing a continuous path of equilibria.
Denote byM := lim supλ→0Mλ ⊆ [0, 1]×[0, 1]I the set of all accumulation
points of sequences in Mλ as λ goes to 0; that is, M is the set of all limits
limk→∞(α
k
1, x̂
k(αk1)), where α
k
1 ∈ [0, 1], λk ∈ (0, 1], and x̂k(αk1) ∈Mλk(αk1) for
every k ∈ N, such that limk→∞ λk = 0 and the two limits limk→∞ αk1 and
limk→∞ x̂
k(αk1) exist. The set M is closed and semialgebraic. Moreover, since
for every λ > 0 there is a continuous path in Mλ that intersects {0} × [0, 1]I
and {1}×[0, 1]I , it follows that there is a continuous path inM that intersects
{0}× [0, 1]I and {1}× [0, 1]I. This implies that there is a continuous function
α1 : [0, 1] → [0, 1] satisfying α1(0) = 0 and α1(1) = 1, and a continuous
function x̂ : [0, 1] → [0, 1]I , such that x̂(s) ∈ M(α1(s)), for every s ∈ [0, 1].
Let s0 ∈ [0, 1] satisfy α1(s0) = α∗1. By the choice of α∗1 we have p(x̂(s0)) > 0.
Step 3: There is η′ > 0 such that p(x̂(s)) ≥ η′ for every s ∈ [0, 1].
Assume to the contrary that the claim does not hold. Since the function
x̂ is continuous, for every η′ > 0 sufficiently small there is s ∈ [0, 1] such
that p(x̂(s)) = η′. By definition, (α1(s), x̂(s)) is the limit of a sequence
(α
[k]
1 (s), x̂
[k](s))k∈N, where x̂
[k](s) is a stationary λ[k]-discounted equilibrium
in the auxiliary game Γα
[k]
1 (s),q
∗
for every k ∈ N such that limk→∞ λ[k] = 0.
By Lemma 2.7, x̂(s) is a 0-equilibrium in the auxiliary game Γα1(s),q
∗
, and
therefore the condition of Lemma 2.9 holds, a contradiction.
We next show that for every s ∈ [0, 1], only Player 1 may have a profitable
deviation from x(s) in Γ. We will then show that there is s0 ∈ [0, 1] such
that x(s) is a stationary equilibrium of the original game Γ.
Step 4: For every s ∈ [0, 1], when the players follow the stationary strategy
profile x(s) no player i 6= 1 can profit by deviating from xi(s). Moreover,
Player 1 cannot profit by deviating to Q1.
By Step 3 and Lemma 2.7, the strategy profile x(s) is a stationary 0-
equilibrium in the auxiliary game Γα1(s),q
∗
. In particular, any deviation in Γ
that is possible in the auxiliary game Γα1(s),q
∗
is not profitable in the original
game Γ, and the claim follows.
Step 5: The case that there is s0 ∈ [0, 1] such that
∑
i 6=1 x̂i(s0) = 0.
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Since
∑
i 6=1 x̂i(s0) = 0, it follows that x̂1(s0) > 0. Since the game is
recursive and positive, and all players except Player 1 continue, Player 1
cannot profit by deviating from x1(s0) in the game Γ.
Step 6: The case that
∑
i 6=1 x̂i(s) > 0 for every s ∈ [0, 1].
For every absorbing mixed action profile x ∈ X = ×i∈I∆(Ai) denote by
u(x) the expected absorbing payoff under x:
u(x) :=
∑
a∈A
(∏
i∈I xi(ai)
)
p(a)u(a)
p(x)
.
Let xi(s) := xi(x̂i(s), αi(s)), see Eq. (1). Denote by u
1
1(s) := u1(C
1
1 , x−1(s))
(resp. u21(s) := u1(C
2
1 , x−1(s))) the payoff of Player 1 if he plays the stationary
strategy C11 (resp. C
2
1 ) while all other players follow the stationary strategy
profile x(s). These quantities are well defined because
∑
i 6=1 x̂i(s) > 0 for
every s ∈ [0, 1]. Since the function s 7→ x̂(s) is continuous, the functions
s 7→ u11(s) and s 7→ u21(s) are continuous as well.
By definition, for s = 1, the strategy x1(1) assigns probability 0 to the
action C21 . Similarly, for s = 0, the strategy x1(0) assigns probability 0 to
the action C11 . Consequently, if u
1
1(1) ≥ u21(1), then Player 1 cannot profit
by deviating from x1(1) to C
2
1 , and therefore the stationary strategy profile
x(1) is a 0-equilibrium in Γ. Similarly, if u11(0) ≤ u21(0), then Player 1 cannot
profit by deviating from x1(0) to C
1
1 , and therefore the stationary strategy
profile x(0) is a 0-equilibrium in Γ.
It is left to consider the case u11(1) < u
2
1(1) and u
1
1(0) > u
2
1(0). The
continuity of the functions u11 and u
2
1 implies that there is s0 ∈ (0, 1) such
that u11(s0) = u
2
1(s0). But then both C
1
1 and C
2
1 yield the same payoff against
x−1(s0), and therefore Player 1 cannot profit by deviating from x1(s0) to
either C11 or C
2
1 . In particular, the stationary strategy profile x(s0) is a
0-equilibrium in Γ.
We now discuss the adaptation of the proof to the general case. As
above, the challenging case is when there exist α∗ ∈ ×i∈I∆(Aci) and q∗ ∈ RI
such that the auxiliary game Γα
∗,q∗ satisfies Condition (A.2) in Theorem 2.6.
For every α ∈ ×i∈I∆(Aci) denote by Mλ(α) ⊆ ×i∈I∆(Aci) the set of all λ-
discounted equilibria of the game Γα,q
∗
, by Mλ ⊆ [0, 1] × (×i∈I∆(Aci)) the
graph of the function α 7→ Mλ(α), and by M := lim supλ→0Mλ ⊆ [0, 1] ×
(×i∈I∆(Aci)) the set of accumulation points of the sets (Mλ)λ>0 as λ goes to
0.
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By Browder’s Theorem one can prove that the set M has a connected
component, whose boundary, when projected to ×i∈I∆(Aci), coincides with
the boundary of ×i∈I∆(Aci) (recall Footnote 2). In the proof above, to show
that a stationary equilibrium exists we used in Step 6 the Mean Value Theo-
rem. In the general case we need to use a fixed point theorem applied to the
set M . In Section 4 we will develop such a theorem. Our proof utilizes the
theory of intersection index, which requires M to be a smooth manifold. By
Kohlberg and Mertens (1986), given the set of players and the sets of actions
of the players of a strategic form game, the equilibrium set is homeomorphic
to the set of games, which is a Euclidean space. This set, however, is not
a smooth manifold. In Section 5 we will prove that the equilibrium set can
be uniformly approximated by smooth manifolds, a property that will suffice
for our purposes.
4 Topological Foundations
In this section we present the results from topology that we need in the paper.
We refer to Guillemin and Pollack (2010) for the relevant background on
manifolds, including the definition of transversality, oriented manifolds, and
the intersection index. One should bear in mind that Guillemin and Pollack
(2010) often consider the case of closed manifolds without boundary, while in
our case some manifolds have boundary. Nevertheless, our assumptions will
ensure that the results still hold, with the same proofs, when the manifolds
have boundary.
All manifolds in this paper are oriented. In this section we use simplexes
and products of simplexes, which are not smooth manifolds in the usual
definition, since their boundary is not a manifold. One way to handle such
manifolds is as manifolds with corners, see, e.g., Joyce (2010). This issue will
not arise in our results; the only place where we do care about the boundary
being a manifold is in Theorem 4.4, and there we will deal with it specifically.
Given ε > 0 and a function f : X → Y , where Y is a metric space
with metric ρY , the function fε : X → Y is an ε-perturbation of f if
ρY (f(x), fε(x)) < ε for every x ∈ X . The basic result in topology that
we need is a variation of Browder’s Theorem.
Theorem 4.1 Let X be a compact k-dimensional manifold with boundary.
Let U be an n-dimensional connected open boundaryless manifold. Let M ⊆
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U × X be an n-dimensional boundaryless manifold that satisfies M ∩ (U ×
∂X) = ∅. Let N be an l-dimensional compact manifold with boundary. Let
y : N × X → U be a continuous function such that for every α ∈ N the
function y(α, ·) : X → U is homotopic to a constant function. Consider the
function y˜ : N ×X → U ×X defined by
y˜(α, x) = (y(α, x), x).
Let π : U ×X → U be the projection and denote d := deg(π|M).
Then for every ε > 0 there is an ε-perturbation y˜ε of y˜ such that
(a) y˜ε is transversal to M , and
(b) the manifold M ′ := (y˜ε)
−1(M) ⊆ N × X satisfies that its boundary is
contained in ∂N ×X. Moreover, the projection M ′ → N has degree d.
To allow game theorists to properly interpret the data of Theorem 4.1, we
explain its relation to games. Suppose that the set I of players and the action
sets of the players (Ai)i∈I are fixed. The compact manifold with boundary X
will be the set of mixed action profiles in binary games,5 namely, X = [0, 1]I .
The connected open boundaryless manifold U will be the set of possible payoff
functions in binary games, namely, U = R2
|I|×|I|. The manifold M ⊆ U ×X
will be a smooth manifold that uniformly approximates the equilibrium set.
Let N be some parameter space, which is a compact manifold with boundary,
for example, a finite product of simplexes, and let y : N → U be some
continuous function that assigns a game to each parameter. In the statement
of Theorem 4.1, the domain of the function y is not N but N × X , but
to understand the theorem we ignore this point. Extend y to a function
y˜ : N × X → U × X by setting y˜(α, x) = (y(α), x). Theorem 4.1 roughly
states that y˜−1(M) is a manifold, and that its boundary, when projected
to N , contains the boundary of the parameter set N . In other words, it
roughly says that the equilibrium set restricted to games in the range of y is
a manifold whose boundary covers the boundary of the parameter set.
To prove Theorem 4.1 we will need a couple of observations, which follow
from the definition of the intersection index.
Lemma 4.2 Let X, Y , and Z be three manifolds with boundary, let f : X →
Y and g : Y → Z be smooth functions, and let M ⊆ Z be a boundaryless
manifold (see Figure 1). Assume that
5A binary game is a strategic-form game in which every player has two actions.
15
• X is compact,
• g is transversal to M ,
• M is disjoint of g ◦ f(∂X), and
• dimM + dimX = dimZ.
Then the intersection index of g ◦ f and M is equal to the intersection index
of f and g−1(M).
X
f
// Y
g
// Z
M
?
OO
Figure 1: The data of Lemma 4.2.
Proof. For every ε > 0 there is a smooth ε-perturbation fε : X → Y of
f such that
• fε is transversal to g−1(M),
• fε is homotopic to f through the homotopy function H : [0, 1]×X →
Y with the condition that every points moves at most ε along the
homotopy; that is, ρY (H(0, x), H(t, x)) < ε for every t ∈ [0, 1] and
every x ∈ X , where ρY is the metric on Y , and
• H([0, 1]× ∂X) ∩ g−1(M) = ∅.
Since H({t}×∂X)∩g−1(M) = ∅ for every t ∈ [0, 1], and since X is compact,
it follows that the homotopy H preserves the intersection index (see, for
example, Guillemin and Pollack (2010, page 108)), and therefore we may
assume that f is transversal to g−1(M).
It follows from the definitions of the intersection index and of the inverse
image that the intersection index of g◦f andM is the sum of the orientations
of (g◦f)−1(M). For the same reason, the intersection index of f and g−1(M)
is the sum of the orientations of f−1(g−1(M)). Since the inverse image of a
manifold is functorial, we get the desired result.
Let f : X → Y be a smooth function between manifolds. A point y ∈ Y is
a regular value of f if for every x ∈ f−1(y) the differential of f at x, denoted
dfx, is onto the tangent bundle at y, denoted Ty(Y ).
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Lemma 4.3 Let X, Y , and Z be three manifolds with boundary such that
X and Z are compact with dimension n, and Y has dimension n + k. Let
g : Y → Z be smooth. Assume that X ⊆ Y and ∂X ⊆ ∂Y = g−1(∂Z). Then
the degree of g restricted to X is equal to the intersection index of X and
g−1(Z), for some z ∈ Z which is a regular value of g.
Proof. We will apply Lemma 4.2 to X , Y , Z, g, f that is the inclusion
from Y to Z, and M is a regular value z of g thought of as a 0-dimensional
manifold with positive orientation. By Sard’s Lemma such a regular value
exists. By Lemma 4.2 the intersection index of g|X and the point z, which is
the degree of g, is equal to the intersection index of the inclusion and g−1(z),
as desired.
Proof of Theorem 4.1. We will denote the set X without its boundary
by X◦ := X \ ∂X . Fix ε > 0. By the Transversality Theorem (see, e.g.,
Guillemin and Pollack (2010, Theorem 70)) there is an ε-perturbation y˜ε of
y˜ that satisfies the following two conditions:
• y˜ε is transversal to M , so that Part (a) holds, and
• y˜ε is homotopic to y˜ through the homotopy function H : [0, 1] × N ×
X → X×U with the condition that every points moves at most ε along
the homotopy.
Since X is compact, provided ε is sufficiently small, along the homotopy H
we have H([0, 1] × N × ∂X) ∩M = ∅. This implies that the first claim in
Part (b) holds. Indeed, since M is boundaryless, we deduce that ∂(y˜ε)
−1(M)
is contained in ∂(N ×X) = (∂N ×X)∪ (N × ∂X). Since image([0, 1]×N ×
∂X) ∩M = ∅, we obtain that ∂(y˜ε)−1(M) is contained in ∂N ×X .
From now on we fix an arbitrary element α ∈ N . By the construction
of y˜ε, the function y˜ε(α, ·) is homotopic to y˜(α, ·), which is homotopic to
const × Id : X → U × X . Moreover, by assumption, along the homotopy
∂X is disjoint of M . Since homotopy preserves the intersection index, the
intersection index of y˜ε(α, ·) and M is d.
We will now apply Lemma 4.3 with the following data:
Lemma 4.3 Our proof
X M ′ = (y˜ε)
−1(M),
Y N ×X◦,
Z N,
g : X → Y π : N ×X◦ → N.
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We verify that the conditions of the lemma hold for these data, and therefore
we will deduce that the degree of the projection from N ×X to N , restricted
to M ′, is equal to the intersection index of {α} ×X◦ and (y˜ε)−1(M).
• The setM ′ is the inverse image of a closed set under a smooth function,
hence it is closed. Since N and X are compact, the manifold M ′ is
compact.
• By definition, the manifold N is compact.
• We argue that dim(M ′) = dim(N). Indeed, by definition, codim(M ′) =
dim(N ×X)− dim(M ′), and therefore, since y˜ε is transversal,
dim(N ×X)− dim(M ′) = codim(M ′)
= codim(M)
= dim(U ×X)− dim(M)
= n+ k − n = k = dim(X).
It follows that dim(M ′) = dim(N), as desired.
• We argue thatM ′ ⊆ N×X◦. Indeed,M ′ ⊆ N×X andM∩(N×∂X) =
∅.
• We note that π−1(∂N) = ∂(N ×X◦) = ∂N ×X◦.
Recall that α is an arbitrary element in N . We now apply Lemma 4.2
with the following data:
Lemma 4.2 Our proof
X {α} ×X,
Y N ×X,
Z U ×X,
f : X → Y inclusion : {α} ×X → N ×X,
g : Y → Z y˜ε : N ×X → U ×X,
M M.
We note that since N × ∂X is disjoint of M , we also have that g ◦
f(∂({α} ×X)) is disjoint of M . We leave to the reader the verification that
the other conditions of Lemma 4.2 hold. We deduce from Lemma 4.2 that
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the intersection index of {α}×X◦ and (y˜ε)−1(M) is equal to the intersection
index of y˜ε(α, ·) and M , which is equal to d. The result follows.
The following result is a fixed point theorem for manifolds, which is close
to a result of Mertens (1989, page 597).
Theorem 4.4 Let ∆ be a d-dimensional convex compact set and let M be
a d-dimensional compact manifold with boundary. Let g : M → ∆ be a
continuous function, and let f : M → ∆ be a smooth function that satisfies
the following conditions:
• ∂M ⊆ f−1(∂∆).
• The degree of f is not zero: deg(f) 6= 0.
Then there is x ∈M such that f(x) = g(x).
Proof.
Step 1: We can assume that ∆ has a smooth boundary, that the image of g
does not intersect ∂∆, and that f is transveral to ∂∆.
Assume that Theorem 4.4 holds whenever ∆ has a smooth boundary
and image(g) ∩ ∂∆ = ∅, but does not hold without these restrictions. Let
g0 : M → ∆ be a continuous function for which image(g0) ∩ ∂∆ 6= ∅. Fix
ε ∈ (0, 1), and let ∆′ε ⊆ ∆ε ⊆ ∆ be two convex compact subsets of ∆ whose
boundary is smooth, whose Hausdorff distance from ∆ is smaller than ε,
and such that ∆′ε and ∂∆ε are disjoint. Denote δ := dist(∆
′
ε, ∂∆ε) > 0, the
Euclidean distance between ∆′ε and ∂∆ε.
For every x ∈ M let gε(x) be the point in ∆′ε closest to g0(x). Then the
image of the function gε does not intersect ∂∆ε. Let fε : M → ∆ be an
δ-perturbation of f that is transversal to ∂∆′ε and coincides with f on ∂M .
Provided δ is sufficiently small, deg(fε) = deg(f) 6= 0. Let M ′ := f−1ε (∆ε),
and apply the theorem to ∆ε, M
′, gε, and fε. It follows that there exists
xε ∈ M such that fε(xε) = gε(xε). Since the manifold M is compact, the
sequence (xε)ε>0 has an accumulation point x ∈M as ε goes to 0, which, by
continuity, satisfies f(x) = g(x).
Since every convex compact set with smooth boundary is diffeomorphic
to a ball, we will assume from now on that ∆ is the d-dimensional unit ball.
Step 2: We can assume that g is smooth.
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Suppose that the theorem holds whenever the function g is smooth, and
let g0 be an arbitrary continuous function. To show that the result holds for
g0, we will consider its convolution with a sequence of smooth bump functions
that converge to a Dirac function.
Embed M in a Euclidean space Rm, for m sufficiently large. Denote by
ρ the restriction of the standard metric on Rm to M . The metric and the
orientation define a maximal form ω on M .
Let µ : R→ R be the smooth function defined by
µ(z) :=
{
exp(−1/z2) z ≥ 0,
0 z < 0.
and let κ : Rm → R be the smooth function defined by
κ(y) :=
m∏
i=1
µ(yi + 1)µ(1− yi), ∀y ∈ Rm.
The function κ is smooth and vanishes outside a ball of radius 1 around the
origin. For every ε > 0 define a function κε : R
m → R by κε(y) := κ(yε ),
for every y ∈ Rm. The function κε is smooth and vanishes outside a ball of
radius ε around the origin. Finally, for every ε > 0 define the convolution
gε : Mε → R, whose domain is Mε := {x ∈ Rm : ρ(x,M) < ε}, the ε-
neighborhood of M , by
gε(x) :=
∫
M
g(x)κε(x− p)ω∫
M
κε(x− p)ω .
The function gε|M satisfies the conditions of the theorem and is smooth. Since
the result holds for smooth functions, for every ε > 0 there is a point xε ∈M
that satisfies gε(xε) = f(xε). Since M is compact the function g is uniformly
continuous, and therefore the pointwise convergence of the functions (gε)ε>0
to g is uniform. Since f is continuous as well it follows that any accumulation
point x of the sequence (xε)ε>0 as ε goes to 0 satisfies g(x) = f(x), as desired.
Step 3: Deriving a contradiction.
Assume to the contrary that the theorem does not hold: f(x) 6= g(x) for
every x ∈M . Let h : M → ∂∆ be the function that is defined by
h(x) :=
f(x)− g(x)
‖f(x)− g(x)‖2 .
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Since there is no x such that f(x) = g(x), the function h is well defined.
The function h|∂M is homotopic to f |∂M , by the homotopy
ht(x) :=
f(x)− tg(x)
‖f(x)− tg(x)‖2 , ∀t ∈ [0, 1].
Note that the function ht is well defined, for every t ∈ [0, 1]. Indeed, for
t = 1 this was already established. Consider now t > 1. For every x ∈ ∂M
we have f(x) ∈ ∂∆, hence ‖f(x)‖2 = 1 while ‖tg(x)‖2 < 1. In particular,
the denominator of ht does not vanish.
It follows that the degree of the restricted function h|∂M is equal to the
degree of the restricted function f |∂M . By the definition of the orientation
of the boundary of M , the degree of f is equal to the degree of f |∂M . Thus,
the degree of h|∂M is nonzero.
Now, the function h|∂M can be extended to a continuous function h : M →
∆, and hence by Guillemin and Pollack (2010, page 108, first proposition)
it follows that the intersection index of h|∂M with a point y ∈ ∂∆ is 0. By
Lemma 4.3 it follows that the degree of h|∂M is 0, a contradiction.
5 Approximating the Equilibrium Set by a
Smooth Manifold
In this section we consider strategic-form games with a fixed set of players and
fixed sets of actions for each player. Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) showed
that the equilibrium set when one varies the payoff function is homeomorphic
to the set of games. The goal of this section is to show that the equilibrium
set can be uniformly approximated by a smooth manifold.
Definition 5.1 A strategic game form is a pair (I, A) where I is a finite set
of players and A = ×i∈IAi is the Cartesian product of finite action sets for
the players.
A payoff function for player i for the strategic game form (I, A) is a
function ui : A → R, and a payoff function is a collection u = (ui)i∈I of
payoff functions for the players. Consequently, the set of all payoff functions
is equivalent to RA×I . A triplet (I, A, u) where u is a payoff function for the
strategic game form (I, A) is a game.
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A strategy for player i is a probability distribution xi ∈ ∆(Ai), and a
strategy profile is a collection x = (xi)i∈I of strategies for the players. It
follows that the set of all strategy profiles, denoted X , is equivalent6 to
×i∈I∆(Ai) ⊂ R∪i∈IAi . A payoff function ui for player i is extended to a
function from X to R in a multilinear fashion.
A strategy profile x ∈ X is a (Nash) equilibrium of the game (I, A, u) if
ui(x) ≥ ui(ai, x−i) for every player i ∈ I and every action ai ∈ Ai. When
the strategic game form is fixed, the equilibrium set is the collection of all
pairs of a payoff function and equilibrium in the game induced by this payoff
function.
Definition 5.2 Let (I, A) be a strategic game form. The equilibrium set of
(I, A) is the set
M := {(u, x) ∈ RA×I×X : x is an equilibrium of (I, A, u)} ⊂ RA×I×R∪i∈IAi.
As mentioned above, Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) proved that the set
M is homeomorphic to the set of games, namely, to RA×I . An important
concept that we will need is that of On-equilibria, which we define now.
Definition 5.3 Let (I, A) be a strategic game form, let u : A → RI be a
payoff function, and let n > 0. The strategy profile x is an On-equilibrium
of the game (I, A, u) if for every player i ∈ I and every action ai ∈ Ai,
xi(ai) =
exp(nui(x, ai))∑
a′
i
∈Ai
exp(nui(x, a′i))
. (5)
Standard continuity arguments show that a limit of On equilibria as n
goes to infinity is a Nash equilibrium. This observation is stated in the
following lemma for future reference.
Lemma 5.4 Let (n[k])∞k=1 be a sequence of real numbers that go to infinity.
Let (u[k])∞k=1 be a sequence of positive payoff functions for the strategic game
form (I, A), and let (x[k])∞k=1 be a sequence of strategy profiles such that x
[k] is
an On[k]-equilibrium in the game (I, A, u
[k]). If the two limits u := limk→∞ u
[k]
and x := limk→∞ x
[k] exist, then the strategy profile x is a Nash equilibrium
in the game (I, A, u).
6When writing ∪i∈IAi we implicitly assume that the action sets of the players are
disjoint.
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Proof. Fix a player i ∈ I and two actions ai, âi ∈ Ai. We will prove that
if ui(ai, x−i) > ui(âi, x−i) then xi(âi) = 0. Since ui(ai, x−i) > ui(âi, x−i) it
follows that there is δ > 0 such that for every k sufficiently large,
u
[k]
i (ai, x
[k]
−i) > u
[k]
i (âi, x
[k]
−i) + δ. (6)
Since x[k] is an On[k]-equilibrium in the game (I, A, u
[k]), we have by Eq. (5)
x
[k]
i (âi) =
exp(n[k]u
[k]
i (x
[k]
−i, âi))∑
a′i∈Ai
exp(n[k]u
[k]
i (x
[k]
−i, a
′
i))
<
exp(n[k]u
[k]
i (x
[k]
−i, âi))
exp(n[k]u
[k]
i (x
[k]
−i, ai))
<
exp(n[k]u
[k]
i (x
[k]
−i, âi))
exp(n[k]u
[k]
i (x
[k]
−i, âi) + n
[k]δ)
=
1
exp(n[k]δ)
,
and the claim follows.
For every real number n denote the set of all On-equilibria by
Mn := {(u, x) : x is an On-equilibrium in u}.
We will show that Mn is a (smooth) manifold, and that as n goes to infinity,
the manifold Mn converges uniformly to the equilibrium set M .
Theorem 5.5 The set Mn is an (A× I)-dimensional manifold.
To prove Theorem 5.5 we need to study a certain function that will be
used in the definition of the immersion7 between RA×I and Mn. The keen
reader will identify the origin of this function and the proof of Theorem 5.5
in the work of Kohlberg and Mertens (1986).
Lemma 5.6 For every n > 0 define the function g(n) : Rd → Rd by
g
(n)
i (x) = xi +
exp(nxi)∑d
j=1 exp(nxj)
, ∀i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , d}.
The function g(n) is one-to-one, onto, and an immersion.
7An immersion is a differentiable function between differentiable manifolds whose
derivative is everywhere injective (one-to-one).
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Proof.
Step 1: The function g is an immersion.
An n×n matrix A is strictly diagonal dominant if (a) its diagonal entries
are positive, (b) its off-diagonal entries are negative, and (c) the sum of
elements in each row is positive. Note that every strictly diagonal dominant
matrix is invertible.
We first argue that the Jacobian matrix of g is a strictly diagonal dom-
inant matrix at all points. Indeed, simple algebraic calculations show that
for every i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , d},
∂gi
∂xi
(x) = 1 + n exp(nxi)
(∑
k 6=i
exp(nxk)
)
> 0, (7)
∂gi
∂xj
(x) = − n exp(n(xi + xj)))(∑d
k=1 exp(nxk)
)2 < 0, ∀j 6= i. (8)
In particular, Conditions (a) and (b) hold for the Jacobian matrix of g at
every point x. We also have
d∑
i=1
gi(x) = 1 +
d∑
i=1
xi,
and therefore
d∑
i=1
∂gi
∂xj
(x) = 1 > 0, ∀j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , d},
so that Condition (c) holds as well, and the Jacobian matrix is strictly diag-
onal dominant at all points. It follows that g is an immersion.
Step 2: The function g is onto.
To prove that g is onto we will show that its image is both open and
closed. Since the Jacobian matrix of g at every point x is invertible, by the
Open Mapping Theorem the image of g is an open set. To show that the
image of g is closed, note that ‖x−g(x)‖2 ≤ 1 for every x ∈ Rd, and consider
a sequence (y[k])k∈N of points in the image of g that converges to a point y.
For each k ∈ N let x[k] ∈ Rd satisfy y[k] = g(x[k]). Since ‖x[k]−y[k]‖2 ≤ 1, and
since the sequence (y[k])k∈N converges, it follows that there is a subsequence
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(x[kl])l∈N that converges to a limit x. Since the function g is continuous,
g(x) = y, so that y is in the image of g.
Step 3: The function g is one-to-one.
We argue that any function whose Jacobian matrix is strictly diagonal
dominant is one-to-one. Indeed, let f be such a function, assume w.l.o.g. that
f(~0) = ~0, and fix x 6= ~0. We will show that f(x) 6= ~0. We have
f(x) = f(0) +
∫ 1
t=0
dftx · xdt =
(∫ 1
t=0
dftxdt
)
· x.
The matrix
∫ 1
t=0
dftxdt, as an integral of strictly diagonal dominant matrices,
is strictly diagonal dominant, hence invertible. In particular,
(∫ 1
t=0
dftxdt
)
·
x 6= ~0.
Proof of Theorem 5.5. Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) provided an
equivalent representation to games. Let u : A → RI be a payoff function.
For every i ∈ I define two functions u˜i : A→ R and ui : Ai → R by
ui(ai) :=
1
|A−i|
∑
a−i∈A−i
ui(ai, a−i), (9)
u˜i(a) := ui(a)− ui(ai). (10)
We denote this representation by u = 〈u˜, u〉.
Fix n > 0 and define a function zn : Mn → R∪i∈IAi by
zn,i,ai(u, x) := ui(ai, x−i) +
exp(nui(ai, x−i))∑
j∈I exp(nuj(aj, x−j))
, ∀i ∈ I, ai ∈ Ai.
Define now a function ϕn : Mn → RA×I by
ϕn(u, x) := 〈u˜, zn(u, x)〉. (11)
Lemma 5.6 implies that the function ϕn is one-to-one, onto, and an immer-
sion. The result follows.
We now prove that the inverse of g(n) converges uniformly as n goes
to infinity, and we provide an explicit form to the limit function, which is
nothing but the homeomorphism defined by Kohlberg and Mertens (1986).
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Lemma 5.7 For every n > 0 let h(n) : Rd → Rd be the inverse of g(n). Let
h : Rd → Rd be the function defined by
hi(y) := min{yi, α∗}, ∀i = 1, 2, · · · , d,
where α∗ := max
{
α ∈ R : ∑di=1(yi − α)+ = 1}. Then the sequence of func-
tions (h(n))n>0 converges uniformly to the function h.
Proof. Fix ε > 0, and let n > 0 be sufficiently large so that ε >
1/(1 + exp(εn)). Fix y ∈ Rd and define x := h(y) and x(n) := h(n)(y).
Assume w.l.o.g. that y1 ≤ y2 ≤ · · · ≤ yd. By the definition of g(n) we have
x
(n)
1 ≤ x(n)2 ≤ · · · ≤ x(n)d . By the definition of h we have x1 ≤ x2 ≤ · · · ≤ xd.
Since
d∑
i=1
(yi − α∗)+ = 1 =
d∑
i=1
(yi − x(n)i ) =
d∑
i=1
(yi − x(n)i )+,
and since x
(n)
1 ≤ x(n)2 ≤ · · · ≤ x(n)d , it follows that x(n)d ≥ α∗ = xd.
For every i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , d} denote
αi := yi − xi ≥ 0,
and
α
(n)
i := yi − x(n)i ≥ 0.
We now claim that α
(n)
i < αi + ε. Indeed, assume to the contrary that for
some i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , d} we have α(n)i ≥ αi + ε. Then in particular
x
(n)
i = yi − α(n)i ≤ yi − αi − ε = xi − ε ≤ xd − ε ≤ x(n)d − ε.
Therefore, by the definition of g(n),
ε ≤ α(n)i =
exp(nx
(n)
i )∑d
j=1 exp(nx
(n)
j )
≤ exp(nx
(n)
i )
exp(nx
(n)
i + nx
(n)
d )
=
1
1 + exp
(
n(x
(n)
d − x(n)i )
) ≤ 1
1 + exp(εn)
,
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a contradiction to the choice of n. Since
∑d
i=1 α
(n)
i = 1 =
∑d
i=1 αi, we deduce
that for every i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , d} we have
αi − dε < α(n)i < αi + ε,
which implies that ‖h(n)(y)−h(y)‖∞ ≤ dε, and the desired result follows.
Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) proved that the following function ϕ : M →
RA×I is a homeomorphism:
ϕ(u, x) := 〈u˜, z(u, x)〉, ∀(u, x) ∈M,
where notations follow the proof of Theorem 5.5 and
zi,ai(u, x) := ui(ai, x−i) + xi(ai), ∀i ∈ I, ai ∈ Ai.
As a conclusion of Lemma 5.7 we deduce that the manifolds (Mn)n>0 converge
to the equilibrium set M in a strong sense.
Theorem 5.8 For every ε > 0 there is N = N(ε) > 0 such that for every
n ≥ N we have
‖ϕ−1(y)− (ϕn)−1(y)‖2 ≤ ε, ∀y ∈ RA×I .
6 Proof of the Main Result
In this section we prove Theorem 2.5. Fix a positive recursive general quitting
game Γ = (I, (Aci)i∈I , u) and ε0 > 0 such that the game Γ admits no sunspot√
ε0-equilibrium. In particular, the condition of Lemma 2.9 does not hold
for some α∗ ∈ ×i∈I∆(Aci) and q ∈ RI . Fix λ ∈ (0, 1], n > 0, and ε <
min
{
ε0
7
,min
{
1
|Ai| exp(n)
, i ∈ I
}}
.
Step 1: Applying Theorem 4.1.
Denote the set of mixed action profiles in an I-player binary game by
Z := [0, 1]I ; this is a compact manifold.
Denote
N := ×i∈I∆(Aci).
Note that N is a compact manifold with boundary. The set N ×Z is equiv-
alent to the set of mixed action profiles X in the original game Γ. Indeed,
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for every pair (α, z) ∈ N × Z, where α = (αi)i∈I ∈ N and z = (zi)i∈I ∈ Z,
corresponds the mixed action profile x = x(α, z) ∈ ×i∈I∆(Aci) under which
zi is the probability that player i chooses the action Qi and the product
(1 − zi)αi determines the probability that player i uses each of his continue
actions. Formally,
xi(Qi) := zi, (12)
xi(C
k
i ) := (1− zi)αki , ∀k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , ki}. (13)
Let U := R2
|I|×|I| be the set of payoff functions for binary |I|-player
games. The set U is a connected open boundaryless manifold. Denote by
M ⊆ R2|I|×|I| × [0, 1]|I| the equilibrium set of binary games, and by Mn the
manifold of On-equilibria of binary games. Let π : U × Z → U be the
projection. We can choose the orientation of Mn and U in such a way that
the degree of π|Mn is 1.
Let yλ : N × Z → U be the continuous function that is defined by
yλ(α, z; a) :=
{
λq + (1− λ)γλ(x(α, z)), if a = ~C,
u(αJ , Q−J), if a = ( ~CJ , ~Q−J).
(14)
This is the payoff function of the binary strategic-form game that is de-
rived from the game Γα
∗,q∗, assuming players discount their payoffs and
the continuation strategy profile is x(α, z). Since U is convex, the function
yλ(α, ·) : Z → U is homotopic to a constant function, for every α ∈ N .
Let y0 : N × Z → U be the function that is defined in Eq. (14) with
λ = 0. For every fixed δ > 0, on the region
X∗δ :=
{
(α, z) ∈ N × Z :
∑
i∈I
zi ≥ δ
}
the functions (yλ)λ∈(0,1] converge uniformly to y0 as λ goes to 0.
For every λ ∈ (0, 1] let y˜λ : N × Z → U × Z be the function defined by
y˜λ(α, z) := (yλ(α, z), z), ∀α ∈ N, ∀z ∈ Z.
By Theorem 4.1 applied to X = Z, U , M =Mn, N , and y = yλ, there is
an ε-perturbation y˜λ,n,ε of y˜λ that is transversal to Mn and such that the set
Mλ,n,ε := (y˜λ,n,ε)
−1(Mn) ⊆ N×Z is a
(∑
i∈I(|Ai| − 1)
)
-dimensional manifold
whose boundary is contained in ∂N × Z.
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Step 2: Dividing the manifoldMλ,n,ε to absorbing and nonabsorbing points.
Lemma 2.9 and the choice of ε0 imply that for every α ∈ N the game
Γα,q
∗
does not admit a stationary equilibrium whose per-stage probability
of absorption is (0, ε0). Since the sequence of functions (y˜λ)λ>0 converges
uniformly to y˜0 on the region X
∗
ε0
in which the probability of absorption is
at least ε0, there is λ0(ε0) > 0 such that the intersection of the image of y˜λ
and M is disjoint of U × (B( ~C, 6ε0
7
) \B( ~C, ε0
7
)
)
, for every λ ∈ (0, λ0(ε0)).
By Theorem 5.8, the manifolds (Mn)n∈N converge uniformly to M on
every compact set of games, hence there exists n0(ε0) ∈ N such that the
intersection of the image of y˜0 andMn is disjoint of U×
(
B( ~C, 5ε0
7
)\B( ~C, 2ε0
7
)
)
,
for every n ≥ n0(ε0) and every λ ∈ (0, λ0(ε0)).
Since the function y˜λ,n,ε is an ε-perturbation of y˜λ, it follows that the
intersection of the image of y˜λ,n,ε and Mn is disjoint of U ×
(
B( ~C, 4ε0
7
) \
B( ~C, 3ε0
7
)
)
, for every n ≥ n0(ε0), every λ ∈ (0, λ0(ε0)), and every ε ≤ ε07 .
We can therefore divide Mλ,n,ε into two disjoint parts: the points in N ×
B( ~C, 3ε0
7
) and the points in N × (Z \B( ~C, 4ε0
7
)
)
, denoted respectively M inλ,n,ε
and Moutλ,n,ε. In particular, for every (α, z) ∈Moutλ,n,ε we have
∑
i∈I zi ≥ 4ε07 .
By the choice of q∗, the intersection y˜1({α∗} × Z) ∩ Mn is disjoint of
B( ~C, 4ε0
7
), for every n ≥ n0(ε). By Theorem 4.1, the projection f : N ×Z →
N , restricted to the set Mλ,n,ε, has degree 1. When restricted to M
in
λ,n,ε, the
projection f is not onto and therefore it has degree 0. It follows that the
projection f |Mout
λ,n,ε
has degree 1.
Step 3: Applying Theorem 4.4.
In an On-equilibrium of a binary game whose payoffs are in the interval
[0, 1], each action of player i is played with probability at least 1
|Ai| exp(n)
. It
follows that for every (α, z) ∈ Moutλ,n,ε we have zλ,n,εi ≥ 1|Ai| exp(n) − ε, which is
positive by the choice of ε. For every n > 0 and every ε ≥ 0 denote
Zn,ε :=
{
z ∈ Z :
∑
i∈I
zi ≥ 4ε0
7
, zi ≥ 1|Ai| exp(n) − ε, ∀i ∈ I
}
.
The set Zn,ε is nonempty and compact, and, as mentioned above, it satisfies
Moutλ,n,ε ⊆ N × Zn,ε. For every z ∈ Zn,ε and every i ∈ I we have zi > 0,
hence the absorbing payoff ui(C
k
i , x−i(α, z)) is well defined for every k ∈
{1, 2, . . . , ki}.
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Define a continuous function g[n] : N × Zn,ε → N by
g
[n]
i (α, z) :=
ki∑
k=1
exp(nui(C
k
i , x−i(α, z)))∑ki
l=1 exp(nui(C
l
i , x−i(α, z)))
Cki ;
that is, g
[n]
i (α, z) is the probability distribution that assigns probability
exp(nui(C
k
i ,x−i(α,z)))
∑ki
l=1 exp(nui(C
l
i ,x−i(α,z)))
to the continue action Cki .
We would like to apply Theorem 4.4 with ∆ = N , M = Moutλ,n,ε, f :
N × Z → Z the natural projection, and g = g[n]. We need to verify that
∂Moutλ,n,ε ⊆ f−1(∂N). Since y˜λ,n,ε is transversal to Mn, it follows that
∂Moutλ,n,ε ⊆ ∂Mλ,n,ε ⊆ ∂(domain(y˜λ,ε)) = ∂(N × Z) = (∂N × Z) ∪ (N × ∂Z).
Since every On-equilibrium is completely mixed, ∂M
out
λ,n,ε is disjoint of N×∂Z,
and hence ∂Moutλ,n,ε ⊆ ∂N × Z, so that indeed ∂Moutλ,n,ε ⊆ f−1(∂N). By
Theorem 4.4 we obtain the existence of a point (αλ,n,ε, zλ,n,ε) ∈ Moutλ,n,ε that
satisfies
g[n](αλ,n,ε, zλ,n,ε) = αλ,n,ε.
The fact that (αλ,n,ε, zλ,n,ε) ∈Moutλ,n,ε has two implications:
• Under the strategy profile x(αλ,n,ε, zλ,n,ε) the per-stage probability of
absorption is bounded away from 0:
∑
i∈I zλ,n,ε,i ≥ 4ε07 .
• y˜λ,n,ε(αλ,n,ε, zλ,n,ε) ∈Mn.
Step 4: Taking limits.
We let ε go to 0, then λ go to 0, and finally n go to infinity. Since the
set N × Z is compact, for every fixed n > 0 and λ ∈ (0, 1], the sequence
(αλ,n,ε, zλ,n,ε)ε>0 has an accumulation point (αλ,n, zλ,n) ∈ N × Zn,0 as ε goes
to 0. By continuity this accumulation points satisfies the following properties:
g[n](αλ,n, zλ,n) = αλ,n,∑
i∈I
zλ,n,i ≥ 4ε07 ,
y˜λ(αλ,n, zλ,n) ∈Mn.
For every fixed n > 0 consider an accumulation point of the sequence
x(αλ,n, zλ,n)λ∈(0,1] as λ goes to 0, denoted (αn, zn). Since yλ converges uni-
formly to y0 on Zn,ε0, we deduce that
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(D.1) g[n](αn, zn) = αn.
(D.2) The strategy profile zn is absorbing:
∑
i∈I zn,i ≥ 4ε07 .
(D.3) The strategy profile zn is anOn-equilibrium in the binary game y0(αn, zn).
Consider now an accumulation point (α, z) of the sequence (αn, zn)n∈N
as n goes to infinity. We will show that the strategy profile x(α, z) is a
stationary equilibrium in the game Γ.
By continuity
∑
i∈I zi ≥ 4ε07 , and therefore this strategy profile is absorb-
ing. By Lemma 5.4, the stationary strategy profile z is a 0-equilibrium in
the binary game y0(α, z).
Fix a player i ∈ I such that whatever he plays, the play is absorbed;
that is,
∑
j 6=i zj > 0. We will show that player i is indifferent among all
actions in the support of αi. Indeed, fix two continue actions ai, a
′
i ∈ Aci of
player i. If ui(ai, x−i(α, z)) < ui(a
′
i, x−i(α, z)), then there is η > 0 such that
ui(ai, x−i(α, z)) < ui(a
′
i, x−i(α, z))− η. Consequently, for every n sufficiently
large we have
ui(ai, x−i(αn, zn)) < ui(a
′
i, x−i(αn, zn))− η.
By the definition of g[n] and by (D.1), this implies
lim
n→∞
αn,i(ai)
αn,i(a
′
i)
= lim
n→∞
exp(nui(ai, x−i(αn, zn)))
exp(nui(a
′
i, x−i(αn, zn)))
= 0.
In particular, under the mixed action xi(α, z) the action ai is selected with
probability 0.
Since zn is an On-equilibrium of the binary game, if zi > 0, then player i
is indifferent between continuing and quitting.
It is left to consider the case that player i is the sole player who quits
with positive probability:
∑
j 6=i zj = 0. It is standard to show that for every
δ > 0 the stationary strategy profile x(αn, zn), supplemented with statistical
tests, is a δ-equilibrium, provided n is sufficiently large.
7 Extensions
In this paper we proved the existence of a sunspot ε-equilibrium in the class of
positive recursive general quitting games. A natural question is whether our
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techniques can be applied to more general classes of games. These include
(a) general quitting games that are not necessarily recursive and positive,
that is, the nonabsorbing payoff may depend on the continue actions that
the players play; (b) general quitting games in which players have more than
one quitting action, as well as more than one continue action; (c) games in
which the absorption structure is not rectangular; and (d) games with more
than one nonabsorbing state.
Regarding extension (b), our proof can be adapted to this case when
the game is recursive and positive, see Munk and Solan (2019). Regarding
extension (c), some results in this direction are provided in Solan and Solan
(2018) and Munk and Solan (2019). We hope that future research will shed
more light on extensions (a) and (d).
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